10TH EDITION. SWINE. EDITED BY. Jeffrey J. Zimmerman. Locke A. Karriker. Alejandro Ramirez. Kent J. Schwartz. Gregory W. Stevenson. DISEASES OF. Diseases of Swine, 10th Edition. Jeffrey J. Zimmerman (Editor), Locke A. Karriker (Editor), Alejandro Ramirez (Editor), Kent J. Schwartz (Editor), Gregory W. Description. First published in , Diseases of Swine, Tenth Edition is a fully revised and updated version of this classic reference. Now published in.
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Request PDF on ResearchGate | On Jan 1, , Jeffrey Zimmerman and others published Diseases of Swine 10th Edition. Public deinitions of animal welfare Diseases of Swine, Tenth Edition. Feb/Processing_Appendix_D_pdf. de Boer E, Zwartkruis-Nahuis JTM. Provides a fully revised Eleventh Edition of the definitive reference to swine health and disease. Diseases of Swine has been the definitive reference on swine health and disease for over 60 years. PDF MB Password: vetbooks. ir Help.
Therefore partners were advised to establish H1N1pdm specific real-time RT-PCR assays for direct testing of clinical samples, or testing of amplification products, to make sure they were free of H1N1pdm  — .
Adoption of such methods during ESNIP3 led to the detection of H1N1pdm virus in Poland in , confirming pig infections that were serologically suspected since in this country . The concomitant circulation of many different virus subtypes in herds increases the risk for co-infections and enables subsequent genetic reassortment.
Full genome sequencing initiated on the ESNIP3 virus repository should give greater understanding of genotypes variation in virus detected, but the current study, based on characterisation of HA and NA genes, already identified reassortant viruses involving the four H1avN1, H1huN2, H3N2 and H1N1pdm enzootic virus lineages.
Moreover, it appeared that the introduction of H1N1pdm into European pig populations led to an increase in the level of incidence of second generation reassortants since In the United Kingdom, additional sequencing led to the identification of H1N2 viruses that acquired internal genes from H1N1pdm .
To date, two reassortant viruses of the second generation, i. Other reassortants with genes from the H1N1pdm virus were also detected at an increasing frequency in areas of high pig population density, as for example in the United Kingdom.
All these viruses may become enzootic at the European level in the near future and raise further questions as to potential zoonotic agents. They have been further submitted to full genome sequencing and antigenic characterization that should provide additional understanding on virus evolution, adequacy of diagnostic capabilities, relatedness to currently used vaccines, etc.
Especially, sequencing of the internal genes will provide information on reassortment events that could not be detected based on initial HA and NA subtyping. Since in the United-States, the H1N1pdm was also shown to have frequently reassorted with old enzootic SIVs  —  , and since clusters of human infection with such a swine-origin influenza H3N2 variant virus H3N2v containing the H1N1pdm M gene were reported each year between April and August, at agricultural fair time  , .
Studies conducted in Asia have also demonstrated a massive reassortment between H1N1pdm and asian conventional SIVs, with much of this event taking place at the level of the internal gene constellations  , .
Considering the increasing genetic diversity among SIVs from a given HxNy subtype, running multiplex PCR methods that may allow identification of internal genes in addition to identification of HA and NA encoding genes could be an alternative for determining complete genetic lineages at the preliminary subtyping step, without having to perform full genome sequencing of all viruses, and should be considered in diagnostic algorithms .
In conclusion, surveillance of SIV infections on a European scale revealed striking differences between countries participating in the ESNIP3 network regarding the prevalence of ancient and newly established SIV lineages. These differences cannot be explained easily. A careful analysis of trading networks of swine and pork within and between EU member states should give clues as to the likelihood of transboundary SIV transmissions. Continuing the surveillance and providing contemporary updates on the viruses that are currently circulating should enable the detection of novel influenza A virus in the European pig population, once a virus has become established and have the ability to produce disease signs in affected animals with a noticeable herd impact.
Moreover, contingency plans were revised and the diagnostic capabilities of the EU labs were assured. During this period, between January and December , ASF outbreaks occurrence of one or more ASF cases on a pig farm were reported in over farms, and more than 8, wild boar cases an individual wild boar infected by ASF virus were reported within the EU 7 — As a reaction to this large number of outbreaks and cases, the Community Veterinary Emergency Team recommended several measures such as: i focus surveillance on wild boar and domestic pigs, ii implement control of animal movements, iii safe disposal of wild boar carcasses, iv avoid swill feeding practices, v implement biosecurity on farms, vi conduct awareness campaigns and finally, and vii review wild boar hunting practices These measures were aimed at reducing the risk of spread of the disease to domestic pig farms and its transmission between wild boar populations.
In contrast to what has been observed in non-EU European countries i.
It includes the measures to be taken in the event of an outbreak of ASF on a pig holding and in cases where the disease is suspected or confirmed in feral pigs.
The main objectives of controlling ASF in feral pigs are to reduce the risk of transmission to domestic pigs and to prevent it becoming endemic in the feral pig population see Definitions 9.
The Directive lays down the measures to be taken in the infected area and the provisions to apply on the holdings of that area. All control and eradication measures applicable are based on classical disease control methods, which include surveillance, epidemiological investigation, tracing of pigs, and stamping out in infected holdings. These measures are applied in combination with strict quarantine and biosecurity measures on domestic pig holdings and animal movement control.
The Directive also requires that Member States develop and implement plans for the eradication of the disease. This Decision establishes animal health control measures on the movement, dispatch of pigs and certain pig products, and marking pig meat from the areas at risk of infection in order to prevent the spread of ASF to other areas of the Union.
Affected Member States and territories are listed in different parts of the Annex to the Decision, the differentiation is made based on their epidemiological situation and level of risk.
In determining the application of control measures on a certain commodity of a certain territory, the level of risk of that area and the type of commodity is taken into account. Indeed, in terms of risk of spread of ASF, movement of different porcine commodities poses different levels of risk.
It is worth to mentioning that this Decision is also aimed at avoiding unnecessary disturbance to trade within the EU, as well as avoiding unjustified barriers to trade by third countries and the provisions that are set in this Decision are aligned with the OIE standards Bearing in mind all of the above, the aim of this study is to review described measures to prevent the introduction and further spread of ASF in the domestic pig sector focused on the EU scenario.
An additional aim of this review was to assess the importance of these identified measures depending on the different pig farming systems see materials and methods section. The literature search was performed in 3rd March and supplemented with further search in 14th December using PubMed database 1 for scientific articles. Scientific papers written in English for reviewing convenience between the last 39 years and were reviewed. To make sure other relevant documents such as technical guidelines, regulations, or scientific opinions, among others, were included, the literature search was performed following the same query on the internet using a common browser.
Commercial farms can be divided into multi-site farms which are holdings specialized on one production step farrowing, nurseries, or finishing and on-site farms which are premises that produce all production steps Study Selection A two step-process was followed to select the literature relevant for the aim of this review.
A primary exclusion criteria was applied when reading title and abstract of found literature abstract when available : i published before ; ii not related to the theme of this review; iii not related to the European scenario; and iv repeated document already selected among retrieved results.
If abstract were not available, the piece of literature would be kept for the next stage. Then, the full text of each selected piece of literature was screened. As a second exclusion criteria, documents v which full text was not available; vi no preventive measures were described; vii described preventive measures were not focused on ASF; or viii information on the theme was insufficient, were excluded.
The explained process was individually performed by three reviewers following the mentioned exclusion criteria in order to cross-check selected literature and resolve any disagreement. Assessment of Described Preventive Measures A group of experts was invited to participate in an expert opinion session to assess the preventive measures identified in this review. Before starting the assessment, the list of measures were reviewed by authors to ensure measures were accurate and clear, as well as no measures were omitted.
In total, 20 experts were invited to participate and contacted by email, 12 of them returned their responses. Experts were asked to perform this assessment within the EU context. Moreover, experts were encouraged to suggest additional measures if they thought they were missing.
Results were recorded in an Excel datasheet Microsoft Corp. Results Selection Process Figure 1 shows the literature selection process and Table 1 compiles the selected literature. The search made on PubMed database returned scientific papers. After applying the primary exclusion criteria, 69 were selected for the second step of the review. However, the full text was not available for 10 of them. Therefore, 59 scientific articles were selected for the second screening round.
The same search on a common browser returned 5, results of potential interest. By applying the primary exclusion criteria, 58 results were selected for the second round, all of them had available the full text. Flowchart summarizing the literature selection process A on PubMed database and B on a common browser. Pieces of literature included in the review process. After applying the second exclusion criteria and completion of the screening rounds, 34 articles 25 retrieved from PubMed and 9 retrieved from the browser search , 4 official recommendations meaning information coming from governmental authorities , 4 reports, 5 scientific opinions, and 5 technical guidelines were included in the review.
The rest of the documents including reports, recommendations, and guidelines were retrieved from the browser search.
Results From the Systematic Review Preventive measures described hereinafter were obtained from the 52 pieces of literature selected during the systematic review. These measures were classified in four different groups: general prevented measures suggested for all types of farms as some of them were common for commercial, non-commercial, and outdoor farms , and three groups of suggested measures for each of the identified types of farms.
General Preventive Measures The risk of introduction and exposure to ASF depends on the epidemiological characteristics of the country, area, and type of farm 31 , 70 , 74 — Pig production in Europe is highly heterogeneous with different biosecurity standards and productive levels 39 , Actions to prevent ASF introduction and spread should take into consideration the epidemiology of the disease, with especial focus on the virus resistance in the environment, routes of transmission, and excretion as well as the characteristics of the farming systems in place 5 , 29 , 38 , 48 , As no vaccine for ASF is available, prevention of ASF relies upon implementing strict biosecurity measures to avoid potential contact between domestic pigs and ASF virus 35 , 49 , 58 , In the EU, movements of pigs or pig products coming from infected areas have been prohibited to prevent ASF spread 4 , 19 , Moreover, the presence of infected wild boar in the area and its hunt constitutes an additional source of risk that cannot be discarded 82 , Minimum biosecurity requirements to apply during hunting in the affected territories have been proposed 5 , 15 , First of all, hunters shall be authorized to hunt after receiving training on basic biosecurity practices.
Hunted wild boar should be tested and only released after receiving negative results. Hunted animals should be moved to the dressing facilities in dedicated vehicles, private cars should be parked outside the hunting field. Dressing facilities would be used if they have tap water, electricity, freezers, and waste water collection. Evisceration should be performed with gloves at the dressing facilities and hands gently washed with soap and water. Offal should be stored in proper containers in the dressing area and then, cleaned and disinfected.
Finally, contact with domestic pigs should be avoided, allowing a 48 h interval between hunting and being in contact with domestic pigs. All of above the needs to be implemented together with education and training campaigns to get hunters involved in control strategies as much as possible 5. Thoen et al. However, it has been also suggested that this ban may be deemed effective only in regions where the habitat is unsuitable for wild boar and where feeding caused artificial population establishment The EU Commission has established minimum biosecurity requirements for commercial, non-commercial, and outdoor farms Health status and free-ASF certificates have to be checked before acquiring new animals 15 , 16 , 18 , 45 , 58 , 63 , On breeding farms, semen 21 , 40 , 45 , embryos, or ova should come from free-ASFV certified farms 15 , 19 , 44 , Donors Links.
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